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IBN KHALDÛN’S THEORY OF THE CALIPHATE:
THE TELEOLOGICAL END OF POLITICS.
MASSIMO CAMPANINI
One of the most intriguing feature of the history of Islamic
political thought is that a complete and articulated theory of the
caliphate was developed only when the historical institution of the
caliphate was dying. In the 5/11th Century al-Māwardī was the first
systematic theoretician of the subject. The caliphate was not an
Islamic state however, but only an Islamic model of state.
The idea of Islamic state is highly controversial and
probably we can argue that only the Medinese state of the
Prophet was really an Islamic state. Maybe the Medinese state of the
rashidun caliphs was an Islamic state, but only for the
Sunnis. In any case, after the rashidun caliphs, the
conditions viable to consider the state as Islamic were no more
fulfilled. Actually, the historical evolution of Islam witnessed the
separation of powers along with the disintegration of the Caliphal
empire in many autonomous states.
It can be useful to examine more
thoroughly this topic[1].
We may begin with the most fundamental question: did the Islamic
state ever exist? Obviously, in order to answer this question we
have to wonder which are the political features making of a state an
Islamic one. Were these features actually developed by the
Islamic political theory? Or did Islamic political theory develop
Islamic models of state, and this because of the lacking of an
Islamic state? It is well known that we are not able to find
out in the Qur’ān clear indications about what the Islamic state
is and how it works. Thus, the most adequate answer to the first
question is probably that the Islamic state is the state where
Islamic principles are fully implemented, that is where is
implemented the sharī‘a which must be considered the
pre-condition of an Islamic state.
But we meet a hard difficulty thereof. Are we really in the position
to settle exactly which are the Islamic principles from a
political point of view (as such as we are able to define which are
the Islamic principles from a religious or philosophical
point of view)? Moreover, it is really problematic to admit that a
state implementing these principles ever existed. Theorically, that
kind of state ought to be the caliphate, at least in Sunni classical
theory enunciated by al-Māwardī (d. 1058)[2].
Al-Māwardī argued that the caliphate is a religious prescribed
institution. Its fundaments are not natural; rather, the caliphate
was prescribed by God in order to manage correctly the Islamic
community. As Ibn Khaldūn put it and we shall repeat later, « the
caliphate means to cause the masses to act as required by religious
insight into their interests in the other world as well as in this
world»[3].
Now, how much the caliphate
can be considered an Islamic state implementing the rules of the
sharī‘a? Surely, this was the case with Muhammad’s rule in
Medina, and maybe – at least for the Sunnis – with the rightly
guided first four caliphs, always in Medina. But how did all
political theorists agree that the Umayyad caliphs and the Abbasid
caliphs were really implementing the sharī‘a? Obviously, no.
Wasn’t it rather a matter of qānūn? In any case, I
believe that almost all would agree that the caliphate, already in
the 4th/10th Century, was an institution devoid of any political
power; therefore, it was no more able to implement a law, less to
say a religious law. The caliphs were disempowered by the sultans
and they had almost lost even their religious appeal. A thinker like
al-Ghazālī was completely aware of this. As Jules Janssens put it:
«The imamate clearly mattered enormously to al-Ghazālī, but only
because he regarded a legittimate caliph as necessary for the
validity of the law in its entirety, not because he saw the caliph
as an ideal ruler, or indeed as a ruler at all. Real politics was
the domain of sultans»[4].
Al-Ghazālī was supremely realistic: the caliph is no more than a
mark of legitimation whereas the sultan manages the real power. Many
other thinkers alike were convinced that the caliphate could be no
more restored and consequently that the reconstruction of the
Islamic state was no more in the agenda.
A sign of this transformation can be detected in the same internal
evolution of the concept of caliphate. Patricia Crone recently
argued that when the ashāb al-hadīth fixed up the number and
the hierarchy of the rashidūn caliphs, a couple of centuries
after Muhammad’s death (and it is worthy to remember the role of Ibn
Hanbal in this process), «mainstream Muslims laid down that
religious guidance could never be concentrated in the head of state
again»[5].
The «multi-purpose polity [that is umma]», as Crone calls it
everywhere, was walking speedly towards a separation of powers. The
ideal situation of Muhammad’s Medina, when, in accordance with God’s
will, political power and religious guidance were strictly
intertwined, was definitely over. Especially under the Ummayyad and
Abbasid caliphs, the unity of the umma was broken and the
political and the religious functions were no more united in the
head of the state[6].
Applying the categories we stated just above, definitely the
caliphate was no more an Islamic state. Actually, in Crone’s
view, the evolution of the Islamic political thought moved
progressively towards a clear-cut distinction of functions. It was
the outcome of the gradual loss in (geographical besides political
and strategical) centrality and in authority of the caliphate. But
it was the outcome also of the defeat suffered by the caliphs in
front of the ‘ulamā’, who succeeded (in Crone’s and
Martin Hinds’ view) to convert the caliphate from the deputyship of
God (khilāfat Allāh) into the deputyship of the Prophet (khilāfat
rasūl Allāh). So, albeit the caliphs continued to manage the
political power, they had to give up the religious power, while the
‘ulamā’ became the custodians of Islamic Law and society[7].
I would comment further this analysis (with whom I do not agree
completely however, because I am not sure that the first caliphs
managed really the religious power) saying that, at least from a
theoretical point of view, until the caliphs were deputies of God,
their state was an Islamic state; on the contrary, when the
caliphs gave up the religious power, their state became only an
Islamic model of state, especially when scholar such as
al-Māwardī tried to restore the caliphal institution subjected to
the overwhelming power of the sultans. When Muhammad geared the
Medinese state, he acted as a deputy of God, so that the Medinese
state was an Islamic state. When the caliphs acted as
deputies of God – provided that they did so -, the caliphate was an
Islamic state. But when the caliphs’ power was restricted to
mundane matters and had no more influence on the religious
arrangement of society, their state was no more an Islamic state,
but only an Islamic model of state.
Now, being stated these
premises (that probably would need a more thoroughly examination I
have no room to do here), the paper will argue that Ibn Khaldūn
theorized the caliphate as the most perfect Islamic model of
state although it was completely out of order and there was no
possibility to renew it. The study of the situation of the Islamic
world in Ibn Khaldūn’s epoch would be preliminary, but I have to
restrict myself to very few hints.The caliphate of the Abbasids (the
potential, but not the actual, Islamic state) was destroyed
by the Mongols in 1258. Albeit the Mamluks hosted in golden
seclusion in Cairo the last survived Abbasids and albeit Mamluk
power was overwhelming in the Islamic world in the 14th century (the
century of Ibn Khaldūn’s life), nobody could deceive herself hoping
to restore the unity of the Islamic umma through the
caliphate. The caliphate was definitely dead. Moreover, the Maghreb
was coming across a deep political crisis. Just in the first part of
the 14th century, the Merinids tried unsuccessfully to restore the
past glory of the Almohads, but after their failure the Maghreb was
lacerated by internal strife with several petty kings struggling one
another in a climate of traison and violence.
I argue that the historical experience of the Islamic world in his
time led Ibn Khaldūn to contend that an involution from a political
and ethical utopia to a patrimonial and tyrannical form of power (khalifa
→ mulk) took place in the Islamic
political practice, along with a progressive secularization and
atomization of power. He felt two needs accordingly: to renew the
utopia of the right government as the teleological end of politics
from the one side, and to build up methodologically politics on the
ground of philosophy, from the other. I will scrutinize mainly the
first topic, postponing the second to another paper.
Just from the beginning of his Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldūn
recovers a common concept of the Greek philosophical thought, of
Plato and Aristotle alike: man is a political animal and the human
beings are obliged to live in society. The idea was widespread in
all the Islamic philosophical tradition in politics, and could be
enough to quote al-Fārābī. Ibn Khaldūn writes:
Human social organization is
something necessary. The philosophers expressed this fact by saying:
“man is political by nature”. That is, he cannot do without the
social organization for which the philosophers use the technical
term “town” (madīna). This is what civilization means. (The
necessary character of human social organization or civilization) is
explained by the fact that God created and fashioned man in a form
that can live and subsist only with the help of food. He guided man
to a natural desire for food and instilled in him the power that
enables him to obtain it. […] Through cooperation, the needs of a
number of persons, many times greater than their own number, can be
satisfied[8].
But
Aggressiveness is natural in living beings,
so that
when mankind has achieved
social organization, as we have stated, and when civilization in the
world has thus become a fact, people need someone to exercise a
restraining influence and keep them apart, for aggressiveness and
injustice are in the animal nature of man. The weapons made for the
defence of human beings against the aggressiveness of dumb animals
do not soffice against the aggressiveness of man to man, because all
of them possess those weapons. Thus, something else is needed for
defence against the aggressiveness of human beings toward each
other. It could not come from outside, because all the other animals
fall short of human perspections and inspiration. The person who
exercises a restraining influence (wāzi‘), therefore, must be
one of themselves. He must dominate them and have power and
authority over them, so that no one of them will be able to attack
another. This is the meaning of royal authority[9].
Ibn Khaldūn’s presuppositions of the birth and the development of
human society are not dissimilar from Thomas Hobbes’ ones: humankind
lives in a natural status of violence and reciprocal opposition; a
restraining authority is needed and who exercises this function
becomes the head of the state, supporting his authority with the
‘asabiyya.
Ibn Khaldūn’s argument is summarized in the following passage worthy
of full citation:
Royal authority is an
institution that is natural to mankind. We have explained before
that human beings cannot live and exist except through social
organization and cooperation for the purpose of obtaining their food
and other necessities of life. When they have organized, necessity
requires that they deal with each other and satisfy their needs.
Each one will stretch out his hand for whatever he needs and (try
simply to) take it, since injustice and aggressiveness are in the
animal nature. The others, in turn, will try to prevent him from
taking it, motivated by wrathfulness and spite and the strong human
reaction when one’s own property is menaced. This causes dissension,
which leads to ostilities, and ostilities lead to trouble and
bloodshed and loss of life, which lead to the destruction of the
species. Now, (the human species) is one of the things the Creator
has especially (enjoined us) to preserve.
People, thus, cannot
persist in state of anarchy and without a ruler who keeps them
apart. Therefore, they need a person to restrain them. He is their
ruler. As is required by human nature, he must be a forceful ruler,
one who exercises authority. In this connection, group feeling is
absolutely necessary, for, as we have stated before, aggressive and
difensive enterprises can succeed only with the help of group
feeling. As one can see, royal authority of this kind is a noble
institution, toward which all claims are directed, and one that
needs to be defended. Nothing of the sort can materialize except
with the help of group feeling[10].
Royal authority is the
natural outcome of human constraints and of the social and
political mechanism of the ‘asabiyya. Now, there are three
kinds of royal authority or sovereignty (mulk): the natural
sovereignty (mulk tabī‘ī), that is the pure tyrannical
autocracy; the political or rational sovereignty (mulk siyāsī),
corresponding to the secular and mundane state, ruled in accordance
with rational principles; and finally the caliphate (khilāfa),
which is a rational and political mulk whose legislation is
neverthless of divine and revealed origin -, a legislation the
successor (khalīfa) of the legislator Prophet is fully
engaged to defend and to implement. Ibn Khaldūn writes:
This makes it clear what the
caliphate means. (To exercise) natural royal authority means to
cause the masses to act as required by purpose and desire. (To
exercise) political (royal authority) means to cause the masses to
act as required by intellectual (rational) insight into the means of
furthering their wordly interests and avoiding anything that is
harmful in that respect. (To exercise) the caliphate means to cause
the masses to act as required by religious insight into their
interests in the other world as well as in this world[11].
The caliphate is
the perfect form of royal authority; but in the present society the
natural sovereignty in the best cases, and, in the worst, tyranny
are predominating. The basis of royal authority is no more reason
and morals, but force: royal authority requires superiority and
force, which express the wrathful animality of human nature[12].
But force can turn right sovereignty into tyranny, while, on the
contrary, the kingdom cannot withstand and endure without justice.
Actually, justice is the very foundation of government and
sovereignty. To explain this basic contention, Ibn Khaldūn resorts
to the traditional “mirrors for princes” (of Iranic origin in the
Islamic political thought) and to Aristotelian philosophy:
The religious Law (sharī‘a)
persists only through royal authority. Mighty royal authority is
accomplished only through men. Men persist only with the help of
property. The only way to property is through cultivation. The only
way to cultivation is through justice. Justice (‘adl), is a
balance set up among mankind. The Lord set it up and appointed an
overseer for it, and that overseer is the ruler.
There also is a statement
by Anoshirvan to the same effect: “Royal authority exists through
the army, the army through money, money through taxes, taxes through
cultivation, cultivation through justice, justice through the
improvement of officials, the improvement of officials through
forthrightness of wazirs, and the whole thing in the first place
through the ruler’s personal supervision of his subjects’ condition
and his ability to educate them, so that he may rule them, and not
they him”.
In the Book of Politics
that is ascribed to Aristotle and has wide circulation, we find
a good deal about our subject. The treatment, however, is not
exaustive, nor is the topic provided with all the arguments it
deserves, and it is mixed with other things. In the book, the author
referred to such general ideas as we have reported on the authority
of the mobedan and Anoshirvan. He arranged his statement in a
remarkable circle that he discussed at length. It runs as follows:
“The world is a garden, the fence of which is the dynasty. The
dynasty is an authority through which life is given to proper
behaviour. Proper behaviour is a policy directed by the ruler. The
ruler is an institution supported by the soldiers. The soldiers are
helpers who are maintained by money. Money is sustenance brought
together by the subjects. The subjects are servants who are
protected by justice. Justice is something familiar, and through it
the world persists”[13].
Also later, in a paragraph entitled: Injustice destroys
civilization, Ibn Khaldūn recalls the Iranic tradition and
explains negatively which would be the principles of justice:
Injustice (zulm) should not be understood to imply only the
confiscation of money or other property from the owners, without
compensation and without cause. It is commonly understood in that
way, but it is something more general than that. Whoever takes
someone’s property, or uses him for forced labour, or presses an
unjustified claim against him, or imposes upon him a duty non
required by the religious Law, does an injustice to that particular
person. People who collect unjustified taxes commit an injustice.
Those who infringe upon property commit an injustice. Those who take
away property commit an injustice. Those who deny people their
rights commit an injustice. Those who in general take property by
force commit an injustice. It is the dynasty that suffers from all
these acts, inasmuch as civilization, which is the substance of the
dynasty, is ruined when people have lost all incentive[14].
In Ibn Khaldūn’s philosophy of history, the states are deemed to a
natural decline and death. States decline because of the loosening
of the ‘asabiyya ties, and because kings and rulers are no
more accustomed to act with justice and become tyrants. Ibn Khaldūn
is fully aware that in the Maghreb of his time both these conditions
are occurring: the disgregation of his world is thus explained. But
all this explains also because the Arab thinker is looking at the
caliphate with a nostalgic attitude. The mulk represents the
natural political kingdom, but the caliphate claims the divine
sanction and chrism. ‘Asabiyya is fundamental in building up
the state: even the Prophet Muhammad needed ‘asabiyya in
order to spread religion and make Islam triumphant. The state in
itself does not need religion to exist, however, although, if the
state resorts to religious principles, it is more strong and more
fit to resist the storm of historical events. Ibn Khaldūn contends
that the caliphate was more than a mulk: it was the
Islamic model of state in which ‘asabiyya and religion
were perfectly interwoven.
As to the characteristics and features of the caliphate,
Ibn Khaldūn’s idea is very traditional and it
does not matter here to deal with it. Rather, we have to study the
evolution of the caliphate to understand the path of its
transformation. Ibn Khaldūn’s reconstruction of the caliphal history
is very meaningful in order to perceive his ideological stance:
When the Messenger of God was
about to die, he appointed Abū Bakr as his representative to (lead)
the prayers, since (prayer) was the most important religious
activity. People were thus content to accept him as caliph, that is
as the person who causes the great mass to act according to the
religious Laws. No mention was made of royal authority, because
royal authority was suspected of being worthless, and because at
that time it was the prerogative of unbelievers and enemies of
Islam. […] The caliphate then went to ‘Uthmān Ibn ‘Affān and ‘Alī.
All these caliphs renounced royal authority and kept apart form its
ways. They were strenghtened in this attitude by the low standard of
living in Islam and the desert outlook of the Arabs.
Ibn Khaldūn’s theory is here consistent with the traditional Sunni
outlook considering ‘Alī and Mu‘āwiya both as worthy persons and
right caliphs. Both of them took care of religion and of the Islamic
empire.
Then came the later Umayyads.
As far as their worldy purposes and intentions were concerned, they
acted as the nature of royal authority required. They forgot the
deliberate planning and the reliance upon the truth that had guided
the activities of their predecessors. This caused the people to
censure their actions and to accept the Abbasid propaganda in the
place of the Umayyads. Thus, the Abbasids took over the government.
The probity of the Abbasids was outstanding. They used their royal
authority to further, as far as possible, the different aspects and
ways of the truth. (The early Abbasids) eventually were succeeded by
the descendants of al-Rashīd. Among them there were good and bad
men. Later on, when the power passed to their descendants, they gave
royal authority and luxury their due. They became enmeshed in
worldly affairs of no value and turned their backs on Islam. […] It
has thus become clear how the caliphate was transformed into royal
authority. The form of government in the beginning was the
caliphate. Everybody had his restraining influence in himself, that
is (the restraining influence of) Islam. They preferred (Islam) to
their worldly affairs, even if (the neglect of worldly affairs) led
to their own destruction. […] A change became apparent only in the
restraining influence that had been Islam, and now came to be group
feeling and the sword. That was the situation in the time of
Mu‘āwiya, Marwān, his son ‘Abd al-Malik and the first Abbasid
caliphs down to al-Rashīd and some of his sons. Then, the
characteristic traits of the caliphate disappeared, and only its
name ramained. The form of government came to be royal authority
pure and simple. Superiority attained the limits of its nature and
was employed for particular (worthless) purposes, such as the use of
force and the arbitrary gratification of desires and for pleasures[15].
Reading this long passage, two phases in the history of the
caliphate stand out clearly. 1) The original caliphate was the right
and the best political system. The main care was religious; the head
of the state was concerned with the welfare of his people and he was
by no means worried by mundane aims, especially to manage power and
to establish sovereignty. 2) Then, the caliphate turned into a
patrimonial power, the mulk, where injustice, abuse, personal
desires were overwhelming. Now, the present situation (the situation
of the Islamic world in Ibn Khaldūn’s time) witnesses a deep crisis
where the natural or even the rational power are no more able to
convert themselves into a really right and fair government. The
caliphate can be no more restored, unfortunately, but it remains a
teleological idea. The right caliphate is placed in a far past, in a
time when the word and the will of God were implemented on Earth,
and religion, ‘asabiyya and state were positively
intermarried and realized the perfect regime, the virtuous city so
to speak. The perspective is that of an utopia discovered in the
past; in a sense it is an anti-utopia or, better, a
retrospective utopia. The perfection was realized in the past;
it would be wonderful to repeat the past conditions in the present,
but unfortunately it is impossibile. Thus, we have to discover in
the concept of the caliphate – the Islamic model of state no
more achievable - only the moral and ethical example of the ideal
state. Ibn Khaldūn admits that the Medina of the Prophet was an
Islamic state; but, presently, being acknowledged the
impossibility to renew the Islamic state, we have to resort
to a Islamic model of state. It is the caliphate, whose
implementation is only a teleological and axiological end. Ibn
Khaldūn’s going back to the past is spiritual, philosophical, not
practical.
Ibn Khaldūn’s retrospective utopia is founded on a highly realistic
and objective vision of history[16].
The study of society through history and the study of politics
are interacting, because politics is the core of society and society
is the main object of historical inquiry. This is the reason why
Ibn Khaldūn and Machiavelli has been often compared. An essential
feature divides the two thinkers, however. While Ibn Khaldūn keeps
on a substantial religious outlook, Machiavelli is persuaded that
religion is a hindrance to the management of power[17].
A common methodological ground can be singled out; and this is very
useful in the perspective of contemporary Islamic political thought.
For reflecting about the relation between Ibn Khaldūn and
Machiavelli leads to a disenchanted reflection on Islam and
modernity. For instance, ‘Abdallah Laroui wrote:
Le pas décisif qu’Ibn Khaldūn
et Machiavel on franchi, chacun dans le cadre de sa tradition
culturelle spécifique, c’est le refus total et absolu de l’utopie.
La pensée platonicienne, qui confond être et devoir-être, fait et
idée, raion et vertu, était dominant dans leurs deux sociétés. Nos
deux auteurs la connaissaient perfaitement et même reprenaient à
leur compte certaines des ses exigences, mails ils n’auraient pas
russi à délimiterun domaine où les affaires humaines peuvent faire
l’objet d’une étude rationelle, s’ils n’avaient commencé par refuser
in toto ses prémisses idéalistes. Ibn Khaldūn affirme en
effet: “Quand les philosophes parlent de cité vertueuse et de
politique civile, ils exposent les conditions qui rendraient tout
gouvernement superflu”. Son propos, à lui, est au contraire
l’analyser les conditions qui rendent un gouvernement indispensabile
à la survie de l’espèce humaine. Machiavel exprime la même attitude,
sous une forme différente: “...molti si sono immaginati republiche e
principati, che non si sono mai visti né conosciuti essere in vero.
Poiché egli è tanto discosto da come si vive a come si doverebbe
vivere, che colui che lascia quello che si fa per quello che si
dovrebbe fare, impara più tosto la ruina che la preservazione sua” (Principe,
cap. 15). Sans ce premier pas, sans cette décision anti-utopique, ni
l’un ni l’autre n’aurait découvert un domaine épistémologique
nouveau[18].
This extreme realism leads the Arab thinker to put history at the
center of his Weltanschauung. Ibn Khaldūn is radically
pessimistic about his coeval political reality, although he tries to
rationalize the political and historical data. In Laroui’s view,
this intellectual attitude draws again our thinker near to
Machiavelli:
La caractéristique d’Ibn
Khaldūn et Machiavel c’est d’avoir, chacun dans le cadre de sa
culture, dépassé cette dicotomie méthodologique entre analyse idéale
et description factuelle. Dépassant le réel empirique, quel objet
ont-ils forni à la science nouvelle qu’ils ont fondée, qu’on
s’appelle histoire réflexive, sociologie ou philosophie historique?
Cette position se distingue par la règle suivante: les actions
humaines ne sont pas le résultat de la raison, néanmoins elles
peuvent être traitées rationellement; elles ne sont pas
fondamentalement rationelles, elles peuvent seulement être
rationalisées. Autrement dit, la raison n’est pas le moteur de
l’histoire, qui lui communiquerait force et mouvement – cela ne peut
venir que de la vie, de l’animalité -, elle est son ornement qui lui
donne sa belle apparence et en définitive sa seule valeur
distinctive[19].
Ibn Khaldūn’s utopia has been defeated by historical reality. The
factual Islamic model of state can be no more realized in
practice. The disechanted and objective analysis of human societies
through history led to a rationalization of politics, as well as to
the keen consciousness that the virtuous city, where justice
dominates and where the king reigns implementing the divine Law, is
just a dream. The best polity is patent however: it is the
caliphate, albeit at present it is out of order and people have no
chance to rebuild it again.
At this point a last observation is unavoidable. Ibn Khaldūn’s
method is new and productive and can be compared with Antonio
Gramsci’s approach. The point is not to describe Ibn Khaldūn as a
forerunner of Gramsci. But, exactly like Gramsci[20],
Ibn Khaldūn views politics as a science grounded in philosophy. For
politics represents the main hermeneutical key to understand
history. History, on the other side, unveil us the “truth” of human
affairs and teaches us how to direct political action without
shortcomings or mistakes in order to realize the welfare of
humankind. As a consequence, history is steadily grounded in
philosophy as far as only philosophy is able to provide history with
a sound methodology of inquiry. As Ibn Khaldūn puts it in a very
important passage:
In its substance [history] is
speculation and verification of truth; perceptive explanation of
the causes and the origins of all existing things, and deep
consciousness of the state and the reason of events. In that way,
history is steadily grounded in philosophy (hikma) and is
worthy to be considered a philosophical science[21].
History is a philosophical science insofar as it is a scientific
discipline, working on sound epistemological premises, grounding its
argumentations in reality, resorting to clear reasoning and analysis[22].
The scientific character of history can lead the people who study it
to re-appropriate politics and political consciousness. As Gramsci
did, Ibn Khaldūn studied history with a political aim. If politics
is the main hermeneutical key of interpretation of history, to read
history through politics can lead Arab and Islamic thought to
re-appropriate its heritage resorting to its own methods and
instruments[23],
and this is, at the end, the real modernity of Ibn Khaldūn.
[1]
For a wider examination of this topic see my works: M.
Campanini, Islam e politica, Il Mulino, Bologna 2003;
Id., Islam e politica: il problema dello stato islamico,
in “Il Pensiero Politico”, XXXVII (2004), pp. 00; Id., La
teoria politica islamica, in F. Montessoro (ed.), Lo
stato islamico. Teoria e prassi nel mondo contemporaneo,
Guerini e Associati, Milano 2005, pp. 17-64.
[2]
Al-Māwardī, The Laws of Islamic
Governance (Al-Ahkâm al-Sultâniyya), Taha Publishers, London
1996. Cfr. H. Gibb, Studies in the Civilization of Islam,
Princeton University Press, Princeton 1982, pp. 151-165; H.
Laoust, Pluralismes dans l'Islam, Geuthner, Paris 1983,
pp. 177-258; H. Mikhail, Politics and Revelation. Mawardi and
after, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1995.
[3]
Ibn
Khaldūn, Muqaddima, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, Beirut
1993, pp. 150-151.
All the English translation are by Franz Rosenthal, Bollingen
Foundation, New York 1958, three volumes.
French
translation V. Monteil, Commission Internationale pour la
Traduction des Chefs-d'oeuvre, Beirut 1967, vol.
I, p. 370.
[4]
J. Janssens, Al-Ghazzālī’s Political Thought, in the
special issue of the “Mélanges de l’Université S. Joseph”, LVII
(2004), devoted to The Greek Strand in Islamic Political
Thought, pp. 393-410; p. 403.
[5]
P. Crone, Medieval Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh
University Press, Edinburgh 2004, p. 31.
[7]
See P. Crone and M. Hinds, God’s Caliph. Religious Authority
in the First Centuries of Islam, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 1986.
See also I. Lapidus, The Separation of State
and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society, in
"International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies", VI (1975),
pp. 363-385.
[8]
Muqaddima, p. 33. Chapter I, The First Prefatory
Discussion, trans. Monteil, vol. I, pp. 85-86.
[9]
Ibidem, p. 34; trans. Monteil, vol. I, pp. 86-88.
[10]
Ibidem, p. 148. Chapter III, On Dynasties, Royal Authority,
Goverment Ranks and all that goes with these things,
paragraph 21. Trans. Monteil, vol. I, pp. 362-363.
[11]
Ibidem, pp. 150-151. Chapter III, On Dynasties, Royal
Authority, Goverment Ranks and all that goes with these things,
paragraph 23. Trans. Monteil, vol. I, pp. 370.
[12]
Ibidem, p. 150. Trans. Monteil, p. 369.
[13]
Ibidem, p. 30. Preliminary Remarks. Trans. Monteil, vol.
I, pp. 78-79.
[14]
Ibidem, p. 225. Chapter III, On Dynasties, Royal Authority,
Goverment Ranks and all that goes with these things,
paragraph 41. Trans. Monteil, vol. II, pp. 587-588.
[15]
Ibidem, pp. 160-164. Chapter III, On Dynasties, Royal
Authority, Goverment Ranks and all that goes with these things,
paragraph 26. Trans. Monteil, vol. I, pp. 401-411 passim.
[16]
N. Nassar, La Pensée realiste d’Ibn Khaldoun, PUF, Paris
1967. G. Turroni, Il mondo della storia in Ibn Khaldūn,
Jouvence, Roma 2001.
[17]
See A. Black, A History of the Islamic Political Thought,
Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2001, p. 177.
[18]
A. Laroui, Islam et Modernité, La Découverte, Paris 1987,
p. 118.
[19]
Ibidem, pp. 118-119.
[20]
Cfr. S. Frosini, Gramsci e la filosofia, Carocci, Roma
2003.
[21]
Muqaddima, cit., p. 3. My translation here; trans.
Monteil, vol. I, p. 5.
[22]
By the way, I agree with Abdessalem Cheddadi’s critique of
Muhsin Mahdi’s approach to Ibn Khaldūn. Although the criteria
used by Ibn Khaldūn to prove the scientific character of history
are philosophical, it is not possible to argue definitely that
he was a philosopher like Aristotle or Ibn Rushd. See Le
monde d’Ibn Khaldoun, Gallimard, Paris 2005.
[23]
See also A. Laroui, Islam et Histoire, Albin Michel,
Paris 1999.
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